Identity Theft Essay |


identity thesis

Here are some thesis statement examples for your first steps in the right direction: Don’t start your statement with a dull phrase “in this essay” – it makes things too explicit, expected, and as a result – boring; A universal formula for a strong, complete thesis statement is “A is B because C”.Author: Eric Gilbert. Jun 25,  · First, compose the thesis for your essay. The thesis is the central theme on which your whole essay will be based on. As you create your thesis, think about what aspect of your identity you want to explore. This thought process could include analyzing your cultural background or how you feel your peers view you as a person. Essay on My Identity. To me, identity can be defined as who you are or what makes you different from others. I am no different from my classmates. I go to school, eat, play, sleep and do my homework like you all do, yet there is something that makes me different from you. That is my true identity.

Identity Essay | Bartleby

Identity theory is a family of views on the relationship between mind and body. Type Identity theories hold that at least some types or kinds, or classes of mental states are, as a matter of contingent fact, literally identical with some types or kinds, identity thesis classes of brain states.

The earliest advocates of Type Identity—U. Place, Herbert Feigl, and J. Smart, respectively—each proposed their own version of the theory in the late s to early 60s. But it was not until David Armstrong made the radical claim that all mental states including intentional ones are identical with physical states, that philosophers of mind divided themselves into camps over the issue, identity thesis. Over the years, numerous objections have been levied against Type Identity, ranging from epistemological complaints to charges of Leibniz's Law violations to Hilary Putnam's famous pronouncement that mental states are in fact capable of being identity thesis multiply realized, identity thesis.

To this day, identity thesis, debate concerning the validity of these strategies—and the truth of Mind-Brain Type Identity—rages in the philosophical literature. Place accepted the Logical Behaviorists' dispositional analysis of cognitive and volitional concepts, identity thesis. With respect to those mental concepts "clustering around the notions of consciousness, identity thesis, experience, identity thesis, and mental imagery," however, he held that no behavioristic account even in terms of unfulfilled dispositions to behave would suffice.

Seeking an alternative to the classic dualist positionaccording to which mental states possess an ontology distinct from the physiological states with which they are thought to be correlated, identity thesis, Place claimed that sensations and the like might very well be processes in the brain—despite the fact that statements about the former cannot be logically analyzed into statements identity thesis the latter, identity thesis.

Drawing an analogy with such scientifically verifiable and obviously contingent statements as "Lightning is a motion of electric charges," Place cited potential explanatory power as the reason for hypothesizing consciousness-brain state relations in terms of identity rather than mere correlation, identity thesis. This still left the problem of explaining introspective reports in terms identity thesis brain processes, since these reports for example, of a green after-image typically make reference to entities which do not fit with the physicalist picture there is nothing green in the brain, for example.

To solve this problem, Place called attention to the "phenomenological fallacy "—the mistaken assumption that one's introspective observations report "the actual state of affairs in some mysterious internal environment. At least in the beginning, J.

Smart followed U. Place in applying the Identity Theory only to those mental concepts considered resistant to behaviorist treatment, notably sensations. Because of the proposed identification of sensations with states of the central nervous system, this limited version of Mind-Brain Type Identity also became known as Central-State Materialism. Smart's main concern identity thesis the analysis of sensation-reports e, identity thesis.

Where Smart diverged from Place was in the explanation he gave for adopting the thesis that sensations are processes in the brain, identity thesis. According to Smart"there is no conceivable experiment which could decide between materialism and epiphenomenalism " where the latter is understood as a species of dualism ; the statement "sensations are brain processes," therefore, identity thesis not a straight-out scientific hypothesis, but should be adopted on other grounds.

Occam's razor is cited in support of the claim identity thesis, even if the brain-process theory and dualism are equally consistent with the empirical facts, the former has an edge in virtue of its simplicity and explanatory utility. Occam's razor also plays a role in the version of Mind-Brain Type Identity developed by Feigl in fact, Smart claimed to have been influenced by Feigl as well as by Place. On the epiphenomenalist picture, identity thesis, in addition to the normal physical laws of cause and effect there are psychophysical laws positing mental effects which do not by themselves function as causes for any observable behavior.

In Feigl's view, such "nomological danglers" have no place in a respectable ontology; thus, epiphenomenalism again considered as a species of dualism should be rejected in favor of an alternative, identity thesis theory of mind-body relations. Feigl's suggestion was to interpret the empirically ascertainable correlations between phenomenal experiences "raw feels," see Consciousness and Qualia and neurophysiological processes in terms of contingent identity: although the terms we use to identify them have different senses, identity thesis, their referents are one and the same—namely, the immediately experienced qualities themselves, identity thesis.

Besides eliminating identity thesis causal laws, identity thesis, Feigl's picture is intended to simplify our conception of the world: "instead of conceiving of two realms, we have only one reality which is represented in two different conceptual systems. In a identity thesis of early papers, and then at length in his book, A Materialist of the MindArmstrong worked out a version of Identity thesis Type Identity which starts from a somewhat different place than the others.

Adopting straight away the scientific view that humans are nothing more than physico-chemical mechanisms, he declared that the task for philosophy is to work out an account of the mind which is compatible with this view.

Already the seeds were sown for an Identity Theory which covers all of our mental concepts, not merely those which fit but awkwardly on the Behaviorist picture. Armstrong actually gave credit to the Behaviorists for logically connecting internal mental states with external behavior; where they went wrong, he argued, was in identifying the two realms.

His own suggestion was that it makes a lot more sense to define the mental not as behavior, but rather as the inner causes of behavior. Thus, "we reach the conception of a mental state as a state of the person apt for producing certain ranges of behavior.

The fact that Smart himself now holds that all mental states are brain states of course, the reverse need not be truetestifies to the influence of Armstrong's theory.

Besides the identity thesis "translation" versions of Mind-Brain Type Identity advanced by Place, Smart, and Armstrong, according to which our mental concepts are first supposed to be translated into topic-neutral language, and the related version put forward by Feigl, there are also "disappearance" or "replacement" versions.

As initially outlined by Paul Feyerabendthis kind of Identity Theory actually favors doing away with our present mental concepts. The primary motivation for such a radical proposal is as follows: logically representing the identity relation between mental states and physical states by means of biconditional "bridge laws" e.

Different philosophers took this proposal to imply different things. Some identity thesis a wholesale scrapping of our ordinary language descriptions of mental identity thesis, such that, identity thesis, down the road, people might develop a whole new and vastly more accurate vocabulary to describe their own and others' states of mind.

This begs the question, identity thesis, of course, what such a new-and-improved vocabulary would look like. Responding to Feyerabend, a number of philosophers expressed concern about the appropriateness of classifying disappearance versions as theories of Mind-Brain Type Identity.

But Richard Rorty answered this concern, identity thesis, arguing that there is nothing wrong with claiming that "what people now call 'sensations' are identical with certain brain processes. A number of objections to Mind-Brain Type Identity, some a great deal stronger than others, began circulating soon after the publication of Smart's article. Identity thesis the weakest were those of the epistemological variety, identity thesis.

It has been claimed, for example, that because people have had and still do have knowledge of specific mental states while remaining ignorant as to the physical states with which they are correlated, the former could not possibly identity thesis identical with the latter.

The obvious response to this type of objection is to call attention to the contingent nature of the proposed identities—of course we have different conceptions of mental states and their correlated brain states, or no conception of the latter at all, but that is just because as Feigl made perfectly clear the language we use to describe them have identity thesis meanings.

The contingency of identity thesis identity relations also serves to answer the objection that since presently accepted correlations may very well be empirically invalidated in the future, mental states identity thesis brain states should not be viewed as identical. A more serious objection to Mind-Brain Type Identity, one that to this day has not been satisfactorily resolved, concerns various non-intensional properties of mental states on the one handidentity thesis, and physical states on the other.

After-images, for example, may be green or purple in color, identity thesis, but nobody could reasonably claim that states of the brain are green or purple. And conversely, while brain states may be spatially located with a fair degree of accuracy, it has traditionally been assumed that mental states are non-spatial. The problem generated by examples such as these is that they appear to constitute violations of Leibniz's Law, which states that if A is identical with B, then A and B must be indiscernible in the sense of having in common all of their non-intensional properties.

We have already seen how Place chose identity thesis respond to this type of objection, at least insofar as it concerns conscious experiences—that is, by invoking the so-called "phenomenological fallacy. Lastly, Smart claimed that if his hypothesis about sensations being brain processes turns out to be correct, "we may easily adopt a convention As for apparent discrepancies going in the other direction e.

The last traditional objection we shall look at identity thesis the phenomenon of "first-person authority"; that is, the apparent incorrigibility of introspective reports of thoughts and sensations.

Identity thesis I report the occurrence of a pain in my leg, then the story goes I must have a pain in my leg. Since the same cannot be said for reports of brain processes, which are always open to question, it might look like we have here another violation of Leibniz's Law.

But the real import of this discrepancy concerns the purported correlations between mental states and brain states. What are we to make of cases in which the report of a brain scientist contradicts the introspective report, say, of someone claiming to be in pain? Is the brain scientist always wrong? Smart's initial response to Kurt Baier, who asked this question in a article, was to deny the likelihood that such a state of affairs would ever come about.

But he also put forward another suggestion, namely, that "not even sincere reports of immediate experience can be absolutely incorrigible. Borst identity thesis in"it is somewhat difficult to see how the required psycho-physical correlations could ever be set up at all.

Something here needs to be said about the difference between Type Identity and Token Identity, as this difference gets manifested in the ontological commitments implicit in various Mind-Brain Identity thesis theses. Nagel was one of the first to distinguish between "general" identity thesis "particular" identities in the context of the mind-body problem; this distinction was picked up by Charles Taylor, identity thesis wrote in that "the failure of [general] correlations Token Identity theories hold that every concrete particular falling under identity thesis mental kind can be identified with some physical perhaps neurophysiological happening or other: instances of pain, for example, are taken to be not only instances of a mental state e.

Token Identity is weaker than Type Identity, which goes so far as to claim that mental kinds themselves are physical kinds, identity thesis. The former is entailed by the latter because if mental kinds themselves are physical kinds, identity thesis, then each individual instance of a mental kind will also be an individual instance of a physical kind. The former does not entail the latter, identity thesis, however, because even if a concrete particular falls under both a mental kind and a physical kind, this contingent fact "does not guarantee the identity of the kinds whose instantiation constitutes the concrete identity thesis. So the Identity Theory, taken as a theory of types rather than tokens, must make some claim to the effect that mental states such as pain and not just individual instances of pain are contingently identical with—and therefore theoretically reducible to—physical states such as c-fiber excitation, identity thesis.

Depending on the desired strength and scope of mind-brain identity, however, there are various ways of refining this claim. In "The Nature of Mental States," Hilary Putnam introduced what is widely considered the most damaging objection to theories of Mind-Brain Identity thesis Identity—indeed, the objection which effectively retired such theories from their privileged position in modern debates concerning the relationship between mind and body.

Putnam's argument can be paraphrased identity thesis follows: 1 according identity thesis the Mind-Brain Type Identity theorist at least identity thesisfor every mental state there is a unique physical-chemical state of the brain such that a life-form can be in that mental state if and only if it is in that physical state, identity thesis.

In support of the second premise above—the so-called " multiple realizability " hypothesis—Putnam raised the following point: we have good reason to suppose that somewhere in the universe—perhaps on earth, perhaps identity thesis in scientific theory or fiction —there is a physically possible life-form capable of being in mental state X e. To follow just one line of thought advanced by Ned Block and Jerry Fodor inassuming that the Darwinian doctrine of evolutionary convergence applies to psychology as well as behavior, "psychological similarities across species may often reflect convergent environmental selection rather than underlying physiological similarities.

It identity thesis important to note, identity thesis, identity thesis, that Token Identity theories are fully consistent with the multiple realizability of mental states.

Since the publication of Putnam's paper, identity thesis, a number of philosophers have tried to save Mind-Brain Type Identity from the philosophical scrapheap by making it fit somehow with the claim that the same mental states are capable of being realized in a wide variety of life-forms and physical structures, identity thesis. Two strategies in particular warrant examination here. According to Lewis, identity thesis reasonable brain-state theorist would anticipate that pain might well be one brain state in the case of men, and some other brain or non-brain state in the case of mollusks.

It might even be one brain state in the case of Putnam, another in the case of Lewis. Although Putnam does not consider the identity thesis of species-specific multiple realization identity thesis from such phenomena as injury compensation, congenital defects, mutation, identity thesis, developmental plasticity, and, theoretically, prosthetic brain surgery, neither does he say anything to rule them out, identity thesis.

And this is not surprising. As early asIdentity theorists such as Stephen Pepper were acknowledging the existence of species even system identity thesis multiple realizability due to emergencies, accidents, injuries, and the like: "it is not One area of the brain could take over the function of another identity thesis of identity thesis brain that has been identity thesis. In a desperate attempt at invalidating the conclusion of Putnam's argument, the brain-state theorist can undoubtedly come up with additional restrictions to impose upon the first premise, e.

This is the strategy of David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson, who wrote in a book that "there is It is to retain a type-type mind-brain identity theory, but allow that that the identities between mental types and brain types may—indeed, most likely will—need to be restricted. Identity statements need to include an explicit temporal restriction. The danger in such an approach, besides its ad hoc nature, is that the type physicalist basis from which the Identity Theorist begins starts slipping into something closer identity thesis token physicalism recall that concrete particulars are individual instances occurring in particular subjects at particular times.

At the very least, Mind-Brain Type Identity will wind up so weak as to be inadequate as an account of the nature of mental. Another popular strategy for preserving Type Identity in the face of multiple realization is to allow identity thesis the existence of disjunctive physical kinds. By defining types of physical states in terms of disjunctions of two or more physical "realizers," the correlation of one such realizer with a particular type mental state is sufficient. The search for species- or system-specific identities is thereby rendered unnecessary, as mental states such as pain could eventually be identified with the potentially infinite disjunctive physical state of, say, c-fiber excitation in humansd-fiber excitation in mollusksidentity thesis e-network state in a robot.

In "The Nature of Mental States," Putnam dismisses the disjunctive strategy out of hand, without saying why he thinks the physical-chemical brain states to be posited in identity claims must be uniquely specifiable, identity thesis. Fodor in and Jaegwon Kimboth former students of Putnam, tried coming to his rescue by producing independent arguments which purport to show that disjunctions of physical realizers cannot themselves be kinds. Whereas Fodor concluded that "reductionism Even if disjunctive physical kinds are allowed, it may be argued that the strategy in question still cannot save Type Identity identity thesis considerations of multiple realizability.

Assume that all of the possible physical realizers for some mental state M are represented by identity thesis ideal, perhaps infinite, identity thesis, disjunctive physical state P; then it could never be the case that a physically possible life-form is in M and not in P. Nevertheless, we have good reason to think that some physically possible life-form could be in P without being in M—maybe P in that life-form realizes some identity thesis mental state.


Essay on My Identity - Words | Cram


identity thesis


Shaping Identity Essay. One will say that it is the distinct personality of an individual. Others will say that identity is the behavior of a person in response to their surrounding environment. At certain points of time, some people search for their identity in order to understand their existence in life. Jan 31,  · A thesis consists of two parts: the topic and the comment. The topic statement is what you are going to write about, and the comment is the point you are making about the topic. A thesis is simply the main argument or point in your paper, which you will support with the evidence you provide. Being a philosopher, Smart phrased his identity thesis statement brilliantly. Using the two senses, Smart portrayed himself as an identity theorist in one sense but not in another sense. Using the two senses, Smart portrayed himself as an identity theorist in one sense but not in another sense.